Never in independent India’s history has a foreign policy issue been so
heatedly and comprehensively debated as the July 2005 Indo-US Agreement
that seeks to end not just American, but global, nuclear sanctions
against India.

The acrimonious exchanges between supporters and detractors of the
July 2005 Agreement precipitated a political crisis with the Left
Parties voicing concern over the Hyde Act passed by US Congress that
legislates an end to sanctions against India and about what the Left
refers to as a growing “strategic alliance” with the US.

Why is it important to sign an agreement with the US on nuclear
cooperation, given the manner in which the US unilaterally abrogated a
solemn agreement with us to supply nuclear fuel for the Tarapur Power
Plant, because we were unwilling to give up our nuclear option?

The answer to this question lies in the fact that, since the Pokhran
nuclear test of 1974, successive US Administrations undertook a
concerted effort to coerce us to “cap, roll back and eliminate” our
nuclear weapons programme.

This effort included putting together a cartel of 45 countries in
the “Nuclear Suppliers Group” (NSG) to join the US in denying us access
to nuclear technology for power generation.

Despite this, we have built our own nuclear reactors and are on the
way to developing the capabilities to build indigenous fast breeder
reactors using indigenous resources of thorium ore. This process will
be facilitated and made self-sustaining if we have large resources of
plutonium from power reactors.

Unfortunately, our capabilities to develop nuclear energy are
seriously constrained by the shortage of indigenous resources of
uranium ore.

This necessarily means that, if we are to significantly develop
nuclear power production we will have to import considerable amounts of
uranium ore — an option we cannot exercise now because of NSG
sanctions.

Moreover, is it desirable for a country like India to face the
international odium of being subject to sanctions by 45 countries?

What India is attempting is not merely an end to American, but
global sanctions, which partners like Russia and France would like to
end. Over the past few years it has been evident that international
sanctions against us will not end, unless, in the first instance, the
US ends these sanctions. This has been conveyed to us by good friends
like Russia and France. Hence, when President George Bush took the
decision to move to end US sanctions, following consultations with
countries like France, it was only natural for us to grab the
opportunity.

Opposition to the July 18, 2005 Agreement on peaceful uses of
nuclear energy is as strong in the US as it is in India. But, even if
there are shortcomings in the so called “123 Agreement” that has been
agreed upon, this agreement is the only key to ending nuclear sanctions
against India now imposed by 45 countries.

NSG members are not bound by US law on their nuclear policies and
will not adopt every measure the Americans have adopted under the Hyde
Act. India has held extensive consultations with NSG members. It is
evident that the country most actively lobbying against the end of NSG
sanctions on India is China, with its faithful partner in nuclear
proliferation, Pakistan, echoing Chinese objections.

There are three issues that need to be considered in any Agreement we sign on nuclear energy cooperation.

Does the Agreement contain guarantees for uninterrupted supply of fuel for the lifetime of imported reactors?

Can we reprocess the spent fuel for use in future fast breeder reactors?

Does the Agreement, in any way, constrain our strategic nuclear
weapons programme, including our right and freedom to test nuclear
weapons, should the need arise? The State Department spokesman
asserted: “The proposed agreement h
as provisions in it that in the event of a nuclear test by India then
all cooperation is terminated”.

The Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, asserted: “The Agreement does
not in any way affect India’s right to undertake future nuclear tests
if necessary”. The US Spokesman soon had to backtrack, as his assertion
was not entirely correct.

Under Article 14 of the 123 Agreement the US could seek termination
of the Agreement and return of nuclear fuel in the event of a nuclear
test by India. But the entire process would involve detailed
consultations, with the US giving due consideration to India’s security
imperatives.

Thus, if India was to carry out a nuclear test in response to
actions by nuclear armed neighbours, the US would find it difficult to
justify or implement sanctions. Further, India will not be able to
internationally justify any nuclear test and avoid worldwide
condemnation and sanctions with or without the 123 Agreement, if it
unilaterally and suddenly conducts a nuclear test at a time when every
other country is observing a moratorium on testing.

Nuclear sanctions will end only after India concludes a safeguards
agreement with the IAEA, the NSG ends global sanctions on India and the
US Congress approves the “123 Agreement”.

It is at that stage that Parliament has to exercise maximum
vigilance on how future imports for nuclear energy are undertaken.
Section 5.6 of the “123 Agreement” provides for India to maintain
stockpiles of nuclear fuel that can meet the lifetime requirements of
imported reactors in the event of termination of US Supplies.

An action plan for maintenance of reserve stockpiles needs to be
drawn up. Any Agreement for import of reactors from the US should
contain specific provisions that we reserve the right to import fuel
for US supplied reactors from countries other than the US.

As a further safeguard, the Atomic Energy Act could be amended to
provide for foreign equity participation in any imported nuclear power
plant.

No reactors should be imported from the US till procedures for
reprocessing spent fuel are approved by the US Congress. Contrary to
claims by some Government functionaries, we do not have an unfettered
“right” to reprocessing under the “123 Agreement”.

The end of sanctions should not be construed as an open licence for
excessive imports. Parliament will have to ensure that a substantial
proportion of our reactors are indigenous, even though they may be run
on imported uranium ore.

Indigenous reactors are more const efficient than imported ones.
Energy security will be enhanced only when we serialise production of
indigenous Fast Breeder, Thorium fuelled reactors. But, at the same
time we have to realise that any future Administration in the US will
not be as forthcoming as that of President George Bush in ending
nuclear sanctions.

International sanctions will end only after we negotiate an
India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the NSG decides
to end sanctions, overcoming China’s opposition. Parliament should
finally accept or reject the terms set by the US and the NSG only after
the entire process for ending sanctions is completed. It makes little
sense to halt or delay the process at this stage.

Source: business line

yea that was really good piece of information but I would suggest Mr.degr8 to pay courtesy to the news website who had posted this information in the first place. no matter where you find it from, I feel that you should practice that.
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2007/08/23/stories/2007082350160800.htm

sorry if this hurt you in anyway and I appreciate that you found out such valuable information. Coming to the topic here, our PM duly says we can exercise our weapons tests but there has been severe criticisms to it. Many news columns have come up pointing out the traps inside the Hyde Act and so on. And if our PM is indeed correct then I reckon that this would be a majpr breakthrough in the power sector as well as nuclear research in India. Obviously it would bring in a number of job opportunities too.